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ABSTRACT

This paper applies the theory of collective action to the
arms race.

The analytical property of strategic interdependen ce

has completely changed since the end of the cold war.
presence of the "evil empire,"

In the

the allies' strategic structure

was "strategic substitutes;" the strategic structure after the
cold war was "strategic complements. "

During the cold war,

defense was a public good, and the small countries had a tendency
to exploit the large.

In the period after the cold war, defense

has become a public bad, and the large country tends to exploit
the small.
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1.

Introduction

After the fall of the Berlin wall, the "evil empire" against the
free world disintegrated. There are, of course, potential local
threats from countries like North Korea, Iraq, and actual fighting
has been going on around Bosnia. Some of these conflicts may threaten
us with the possibility of nuclear war, but the simple division of
the world into the capitalist allies and the socialist bloc no longer
exists.
We will study the strategic structure of the post cold-war world,
by applying a simple framework of the Nash equilibrium in game theory.
To understand the nature of strategic interdependence in peace and
military issues, the natural methodology is game theory. In fact,
game theory was developed first as a theory of economic warfare, by
von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). 1 I chose this topic of game
theoretic approach also because I thought this type of topic might
attract the younger generation of economists whose participation in
the ECAAR in Japan as ~ell as in the United States is strongly needed.
We will argue that the analytical properties of strategic
interdependence have completely changed since the end of the cold
war. In short, the strategic structure between the allies in presence
of the "evil empire" had the nature of "free-ridership" or of
"strategic substitutes"; that between nations after the cold war
has the nature of "keeping up with the Joneses," or of "strategic
complements."

1
I often listen to the account of Shizuo Kakutani, who is known to economists for
his fixed point theorem, on the research of van Neumann and Morgenstern at the Institute
for.Advanced Studies at Princeton. He tells us that the theory of games was first known
as the theory of economic warfare, and that his notes and research materials related to
van Neumann's work were confiscated in New York when he had to go home on an exchange boat
sent to repatriate U.S. and Japanese civilians stranded on the wrong side after the outbreak
of the war.

Before the breaking down of the Berlin wall, the alliance against
the Communist bloc played the game of public goods where most
countries tried to shift the burden of defense on to other countries.
They were motivated to let others spend more on mutual defense. For
the alliance as a whole, the supply of public goods fell short of
the optimal level. The large country, or the hegemon, had incentives
to spend for the international public good.
The result was
characterized by the phrase: "The small exploits the large" (Olson
1965, Olson and Zeckhauser, 1966). Small countries deviate more from
the appropriate supply of the public goods. In this situation, one
country's increase in defense spending is countered by another's
decrease.
Modern game theorists call this situation the case of
"strategic substitutes" in the Nash equilibrium.
After the breakdown, what the alliance stood for became vague.
The strategic structure has changed (Downs ed. 1994). We aim to
characterize the exact nature of this structural change. In this
changed world, nations do not know which other nations will be allies
or enemies tomorrow. A nation will spend more on defense if another
country, particular its neighbor, spends more. Nations engage in
the process of "keeping up with the Joneses." Here the extra defense
spending turn into "public bad" rather than "public good" and the
supply of public bad risks becoming excessive. It will be shown below
that small countries expand their expenditure more than proportion
ally to their size. Figuratively, one could describe this situation
"the large exploits the small." At least small countries spend more
proportion of national income on defence expenditure. This situation
is known in game theory., as the case of "strategic complements."
In this paper we will address the nature of arms races or arms
reduction before and after the melting ice of the Cold War. First,
we will analyze how the strategic structure of interdependence
changed after the fall of the Berlin wall and how the strategic
structure of national incentives is related to the size of nations
(Sections 2 and 3).
Then, given the structure of international
interdependence during and after the cold war, we will briefly
discuss the problem of incentive compatibility in arm races. The
question is: Is there any incentive structure for nations to reduce
the abuse of their arms expenditures? In our simple framework, the
answer to this question tends to be on the negative, pessimistic side
( Section 4).
Finally, we will conclude this short paper by
summarizing the result and referring to related topics such as
brinkmanship.
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2.

The Hegemon and the Supply of Public Good during the Cold
War

Before the fall of the Berlin wall, the Western Allies commonly
believed that their military alliance was a desirable thing and that
their military expenditures had the nature of an international public
good, or more precisely, a club-type public good. The same sentiment
was most likely shared by countries in the socialist bloc. In other
words, there was an evil empire on the opposite side of the Iron
Curtain. At that time the major question was one of burden sharing
of the defense expenditure: How, for example, do the Allies in NATO
share the burden of defense expenditure? How are they motivated to
contribute to the mutual defense? And are there not temptations to
free ride by relying on other countries and, in particular, on the
leader country like the United States? Similar questions could be
asked for the nations within the Soviet bloc.
An early, but stil],. influential argument, was developed by Olson
(1965) and Olson & Zeckhauser (1965). Addressing the economics of
military alliances, they found in the example of relative
expenditures by NATO countries that a larger country spent a larger
proportion of national income on military expenditure than smaller
countries. The theoretical foundation of this tendency was developed
as the theory of collective action (Olson, 1965).
Game theory is not explicitly treated in his book, but the concept
of the Nash solution is implicitly used in his analysis. The logic
goes like this.
First, the military alliance creates a defense
capacity that is an international public good. It is a public good
in the sense that one cannot exclude a member of the alliance from
consuming and enjoying the service of the collective defense (non
exclusiveness ); it is a public good because if a nation enjoys the
service of the alliance, the benefit to another nation will not be
diminished (non-rivalry) .
Of course, these statements are a little too strong.
Some
exclusivity can be obtained under certain circumstances , and in that
case the collective defense turns into a club good.
Non
exclusiveness does not apply in this case. Also, if a military power
is defending one country, probably another country may find itself
less secure if the force is employed on its border. Non-rivalry does
not apply.
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But these are subtle qualifications. The basic logic of the
following public good analysis will essentially hold even if we take
these qualifications into account.
Let us develop simple examples of the alliance before the end of
the Cold War. They are adapted versions of the model developed in
Hamada, (1995). Though they are simple examples, they illustrate
the basic property of strategic interdependence.
Suppose there are two goods; private good, good 1, that is
consumption good and public good; good 2, that is defense. The public
good has the nature of non-rivalry and non-exclusiveness.
Each
citizen and, accordingly, nation contributes a certain amount of
income to the supply of defense as an international public good for
security. The hegemon has a population (normalized by the world
population) of 1 - e, and the smaller country has the population of
e.
Suppose the utility of a representative individual in the two
countries is respectively

where c 1 , c 2 are per capita consumption of private good and defense
by the citizen of the hegemon, and c 1 *, c 2 * are consumption of private
good and defense by the citizen of the smaller country. a is the
proportion of income that a nation would spend if there were no
expenditure for defense by the other nation. 2
Each individual of country 1 receives a unit of income that is
given like manna in the form of private good 1, a part of which she
consumes as good 1, and the rest of which she contributes to the
alliance to provide defense. Each individual in country 2 similarly
receives y* unit of income. Thus

Here x 2 and x 2 * are the per-capita contributions of citizens in the
two countries. The world per-capita supply of defense is assumed
to be the weighted sum of these contributions:

2

We can obtain the same qualitative results without assuming specific forms of the
utility function as long as the utility function is homothetic, but we rely on ( 1) for the
sake of exposition.
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The governments collect these contributions equally from individu
als. They are assumed to play strategically given the amount of the
contributions of the other country.
One can derive the reaction curve of each country in terms of its
contribution to the alliance. By maximizing utility ( 1), given the
budget constraint (2) and defense provision (3) ,- and given the value
of x 2 or x 2 * of the other country, we obtain

€

where 0 is defined by 0= (l _ e) • A smaller value of E corresponds
to a smaller value of 0, that is, a higher degree of dominance of the
hegemon. If the two countries have the same size 0 = 1. The resulting
Nash equilibrium is given by the pair x 2 and x 2 *,

(Sa)

x2

X 2*

(Sb)

x2

(Sc) x 2

= [y

-

= [y*

0(1 - a)y* J / ( 2

-

0-1( 1 -a)y]/(2

= ay, x*
=
2

=

0,

-

x2*

=

o,

a),
y
- > 0(1 - a)
a), if 0(1 - a)-1 >
= y*
=

-

if 'I_>
y* = 0(1 - a)-1

ay* if

~* ~ 0 ( 1 - a)

which never happens if y* > y and 0< 1.
The case (Sb) indicates where the hegemon can become a privileged
group on its own. More precisely, the hegemon has to be a privileged
group because the other country does not spend on defense. Case (Sc)
is unlikely to occur because we assume 0 is small.
Figure 1 illustrates these reaction curves. If e, and accordingly
0, are small, the reaction curve of the hegemon does not diverge from
the optimal provision of the defense expenditure x 2 = ay. The internal
Nash solution described by (i) is shown by the intersection of two
reaction curves. In fact one can easily ascertain that the contract
curve (or the Pareto optimal cooperative solution) lies on a curve
that passes through point (ay, ay*) . On the other hand, when E and
0 are small, the reaction curve of the smaller country diverges
greatly from the optimal provision x 2 * = ay*. As is indicated in the
diagram, the small can exploit the large in this case involving the
public good.
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This type of approach was taken by Olson ( 1965), and by Olson and
Zeckhauser (1966). The latter work includes a diagram similar to
Figure 1, and the former contains the well-known remark, "there is
a systematic tendency for 'exploitation' of the great by the small"
(Olson, 1965, p.29). Olson and Zeckhauser support this hypothesis
by examining NATO countries' defense expenditure data. Few seem to
be clearly aware of the fact, however, that this exploitation
property stems from the situation involving the suppl.y of a public
good and that the opposite is true in the situation with the private
good (see Hamada 1995).
A similar approach can be applied if there are many small
countries and a large hegemon. Suppose that a small country occupies
a fraction E of the world economy, but that there are n small
countries. The hegemon's reaction function does not change except
that 0 is defined as nt/(1 - nt). Reaction functions of smaller
countries are modified. That is,
( 6) x

2

a

1-ne

[ (1-a)n+a]

(1-a)ne+ae

= ay - 0 ( 1 - a) x *, x * = - - - - - y*- - - - - ( 1 - a) x 2 •
2

2

The behavior of smaller countries will divert even further (Figure
2). The resulting Nash (internal) equilibrium is given by
( 7)

l

0(1-a)a
x 2 = [ ay - - - - - y * ID, x*=
2
(1-a)n+a

[

(1-ne)(l-a)ay

ay*

---------[(1-a)n+a]e

(1-a)n+a

l

/D,

where D is the determinant defined as
D -

1 -

n(l - a) 2

/

[(l - a)n

+

a]

which is found to be always positive.
In the terminology of modern game theory, the situation of public
good is called the case of strategic substitutes. In this situation,
both reaction curves are negatively sloping. If one country expands
its military expenditure, the other has an incentive to reduce its
own. The expenditure of one party works to substitute the expenditure
of the other.
Table 1 shows the simplified pay-off matrix of the game just
described for a symmetric world. Two equal sized countries are in
a military alliance and jointly cope with a common enemy. If both
countries take substantial responsibility for military spending, the
outcome ( 2, 2) will be realized. However, a country can take a free
ride strategy that it will save its military expenditure once the
other country provides sufficient defense spending. If both take
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this free ride attitude, then the alliance will end up with less than
Accordingly, as in Figure 1 the
optimal military expenditures.
reaction curve of country 1, which is the focus of country 1 's optimum
response given the other country's strategy has a downward slope.
That is, if the other country spends more, then this country will
spend less.
Moreover, if we introduce a big country and a small country, the
former is much more motivated to defend the region. If we consider
the free world where the United States occupies a large space relative
to other countries, then the United States will have an intrinsic
interest to defend all the territory of the free world. A large
country is more concerned with its territory. To protect its well
being, the large country is motivated to share a substantial or even
the total burden of defense expenditure. (If it is motivated to share
the total burden, we call it a privileged group.) On the other hand,
as long as the large country, the hegemon, spends a large amount on
defense, small countries do not much improve their welfare if they
spend on defense. The reason is that the defense as an international
public good is the result of the sum of activities of the allied
countries. 3
From this
contributions
tendency for a
of the burden

angle, Olson and Zeckhauser calculated the relative
in NATO's defense expenditure and observed the
larger country to pay more than a proportionate share
of military expenditures.

The reaction curve of a small country comes down and a large country has to bear
a substantial or a total volume of defense expenditure.
3
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3.

Competition for Defense Expenditures After the Fall of the
Berlin Wall

From the time the ice of the Cold War began to melt, the strategic
structure of military interdependence has changed.
There is no
strong absolute enemy or "evil empire". On the other hand, one nation
does not know which other country may become its potential enemy.
Yesterday's friend may be tomorrow's enemy. And if one country starts
increasing its military expenditures, other countries are compelled
to match that spending. In this sense the strategic structure has
changed. In this situation, even though they know reducing armaments
is mutually beneficial, each country worries about the spending by
its neighbor and expands its military expenditures. Hypothetically,
if Iran's military expenditure increases, so does Iraq's. For the
world as a whole, a competitive arms race will develop. In this case,
the exploitation of the large by the small does not apply. Rather,
small countries tend to spend a larger proportion of their income
on defense.
Thus, let us consider the case that the expansion of defense
expenditure by a neighboring nation is detrimental to the country.
Let us assume the same utility functions ( 1) , consumption constraints
( 2) as in the last section. However, in this section we will assume
that the level of security depends on the difference between one's
defense expenditure ( adjusted by the country size) and a part of the
other country's expenditure (adjusted by its country size):

where

O<

P<

l indicates the degree of neighborhood effect.

In the same way as in the previous section, one can derive the
reaction curves in the following form:

where 0 is again equal to e/(1 - e).
Hereonecanseethereactioncurvesarepo sitivelysloped (Figure
2).
In this simple model, the contract curve passes through the
origin.
The intersection of the reaction curves gives the Nash
solution where defense expenditure of nations far exceeds the
desirable one. The Nash equilibrium is always internal and given
by
a,[y

+

0(1 -a)By*]/D, x 2 * = a[y* - e- 1 (1 - ab]/D,
D
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1 -

(1 -a)2s2

if 0 is small, x 2 * will become large. Thus a smaller country will
spend a larger proportion of its income on defense. We can thus
paraphrase Olson's familiar dictum as "the large exploit the small."
Small countries correspond to a lower value of 0 for the reaction
function determining x 2 *, and relatively small countries tend to
spend more than proportionately on defense. This section shows that
competitive arms build-ups will follow once each country looks on
its neighbors as potential enemies.
It may be possible to argue that many Asian countries are
expanding their armaments according to the strategic complements
structure. Also after the disappearance of the communist bloc's
threat, the nature of strategic interdependence has changed to
emphasize the strategic complements nature within a bloc. In fact
Olson and Zeckhauser noticed in their classical article that if
alliance countries are mutually, even partially, hostile toward each
other then the alliance will be strong. If they spend to defend
themselves against their neighbor, then they automatically spend for
defending the alliance. But what they considered as an auxiliary
element now becomes in the changed framework the main element that
leads strategic confrontations.
The pay-off table in the post cold-war world can be depicted as
Table 2. If two countries reduce arms, everything will be fine. If
one of them reduces its armed forces but the other expands them, this
could increase the prospects that the arms reducing country will be
invaded by the other. Basic conflicts between hostile governments
take this form. In fact, even during the cold war this was the basic
structure between the western allies and the communist/socialist
bloc countries. Within each alliance there are problems of free
riding as analyzed by Olson and Zeckhauser, but between the alliances
or blocs this structure of strategic complements existed. 4
I

4
Under the American Constitution (The Second Amendment), the right to bear arms is
recognized. This article made much sense when it was established, because Americans had
to fight against the colonizing enemies. The right to resist against the enemies by
federation was the situation of strategic substitutes. When this article is invoked to resist
gun control, however, the situations in American cities are those of strategic complements.
In this current situation, bearing arms to protect other (or public officials?) will result
in an unfavorable equilibrium in the prisoners' dilemma.
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From our analysis, we obtain two testable hypotheses:

( i) Within a military alliance, and particularly before the breakdown
of the cold war, large countries spend more than proportionately
(with respect to their size) on defense.
(ii)Without the military alliance, smaller countries spend more than
proportionately (with respect to their size) on defense.
Also one can take account of various topological factors:
geographical, ethnic, religious and cultural distance between
countries. One can examine the distance of the relationship in terms
of circular matrices. One can modify the formulation to take account
of political systems such as dictatorship, democracy or post
socialist states, and the degree of international transactions like
trade and investment, and most importantly the current situation of
the nation and its preconditions given by its history.
Figure 3 depicts the ratios of military expenditure to GDP and
how NATO nations ranked by population in 1993. Here one can detect
a weak positive relationship long discussed since Olsons and
Zeckhauser. This is the prediction from the theory of collective
action, the case of strategic substitutes.
Figure 4A and 4B
( excluding China) show the same relationship for Asian counties where
no strong military alliances exist between countries. This figure
indicates a surprisingly strong negative relationship --- just as
predicted by the strategic complements model discussed in this
section.
Incidentally, the strategic structure of international policy
coordination and monetary interdependence has two structurally
different relationships.
Under a fixed exchange rate system,
monetray interdependence assumes the nature of strategic substi
tutes. If one country provides more money, then the other countries,
trying to reduce the inflationary pressure, reduce their money
supply.
Therefore, an expansion in one country is offset or
substituted by a reduction in the others.
On the other hand, under one flexible exchange rates an expansion
of the monetary policy by country may be transmitted to others as
a contradictory shock. Therefore, it triggers an expansionary
monetary policy in other countries. Expansion is matched by
expansion, which is a strategic complements situation.
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4.

Revelation of Information and the Structure of Interdependence

The difference between strategic substitutes and strategic
complements has recently attracted the attention of economists and
game theorists. The difference can decide in many cases the direction
of comparatively static results in the Nash equilibrium.
First, we can change the game slightly, and make it a succession
of two players, a first mover and a second. Then it is shown (Gal
Or, 1985) that the first mover has an advantage under strategic
substitutes and the second mover has an advantage under strategic
complements. In our military context, in the case of the free-rider
game under the cold war regime, the United States would be able to
profit from its leadership.
Its credible commitment would win
favorable responses from others. Under the situation of strategic
complements, as has prevailed since the Berlin Wall, a waiting
strategy is beneficial. Why don't we wait for the other country?
The logic is: After watching your potential enemy's arms build-up,
you will start boosting your armaments to make them a little stronger
than your potential opponent ' s. Thus the waiting strategy will work.
Under the strategic substitutes case, the United States can
easily assume the leadership role because of its size. Its first
move can be taken as a definite signal.
Under the strategic
complements case, no country, not even the United States, will have
incentives to take the initiative. The situation will thus become
more ambiguous, and possibly unstable.
The sec.end interesting implication of the distinction between
strategic substitutes and complements concerns the revelation game
of information. Suppose it is not easy to know the cost and benefit
data of the opponent in arms races. Okuno, Postlewaite and Suzumura
( 1990) considered the following situation. Suppose the home country
cannot detect the foreign country's cost benefit data concerning the
level of military technology. On the other hand, the foreign country
is capable of knowing the home country's cost benefit structure and
accordingly its reaction curve. For simplicity, let us assume that
only the home country does not know whether the foreign country has
a low cost of producing arms (but possesses the nuclear technology,
for example) or a high cost of producing arms (does not possess
nuclear technology).
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Under this asymmetric information structure, the foreign country
has the choice of whether to announce its cost structure, or to keep
it secret. In other words, the foreign country can reveal or conceal
whether it has a low cost and accordingly is capable of behaving in
an aggressive fashion or it has a high cost. Then the game consists
of two stages: the first stage of information revelation, and the
second stage of arms build-up.
For example, the question is as follows: For a European NATO
member country, is there an incentive to tell the other members of
the NATO, particularly the United States, whether or not it has the
technology to produce weapons cheaply?
Okuno et. al. (1990) give a clue to this question. Suppose,
in accordance with them that after the announcement, the low cost
structure of military armaments by country 1 can be verified by
country 1, but that the high cost structure cannot be verified.
Presumably, a high productivity of producing defense equipments such
as nuclear weapons can be easily verified. But if it is kept secret,
it is not easy from the first country to detect whether the second
country has high productivity in producing arms. Let us remember
the initial premise that the cost structure of the home country is
known to the foreign country.
Let us start from the case of the strategic substitutes. That
is, the case of a military alliance. Figure 5 illustrates the
incentive for information revelation. The reaction curve of the
foreign country is either R*I\* or R*R8 *, depending on whether it has
a low or a high cost structure. Without revelation and some
simplifying assumptions of linearity, the home country takes the
average and R*R* becomes the foreign country's reaction curve.
Therefore the home country takes strategy X and the foreign country
takes the strategy on R*R8 * or R*RL* depending on its cost structure.
The resulting equilibrium is either PL or P8 • If the foreign country
reveals its cost structure truthfully, the home country knows the
position of the true reaction curve of the foreign country and
achieves Q ors.
In this situation, it is not profitable for the foreign country
to reveal that it has low costs, because the home country will reduce
military expenditures and thus shift the burden to the foreign
country. Then the equilibrium shift from PL to Q. Even though the
low cost structure can be verifiable by our assumption, this
revelation is not supported by the incentive mechanism, because the
12

foreign country loses its free-riding position. On the other hand,
it is profitable for the foreign country to announce that it has high
costs because by that revelation the foreign country would enjoy more
of the free rider status. If the announcement is
believed, the
equilibrium moves from P to S. Unfortunately, the foreign country
gains by pretending that it has high costs even though it has low
costs, because in the latter the equilibrium would shift from PL to
P 5 • The revelation of the high costs thus creates the credibility
problem and does not work either. In the real world example, if a
European country says that it does not have high productive capacity
for defense, it is not verifiable under our assumption. It might
be interpreted as a pretext for further free riding, and accordingly
might not be believed.
Similarly, Figure 6 illustrates the incentive for information
revelation in the case of strategic complements. The reaction curve
of the foreign country is either R*RL* or R*R8 *. Without revelation,
the home country takes the average and takes R*R* as the foreign
country's reaction curve. Therefore the home country adopts strategy
X and the foreign country chooses the strategy on R*RL* or R*R8 *
depending on its cost structure. The resulting equilibrium is either
PL or P 8 •
If the foreign country reveals its cost structure
truthfully, the home country knows the position of the true reaction
curve of the foreign country and achieves Q ors.
In this situation, it is not profitable for the foreign country
to reveal that it has low costs, because the home country will build
up its own armaments and the equilibrium will then shift from PL to
Q.
Even though the low cost structure is verifiable by our
assumption, such a revelation is not supported by the incentives for
the country that has the choice to announce or not. On the other
hand, it is profitable for the foreign country to reveal that it has
high costs. Unfortunately, the foreign country gains by pretending
that it has high costs even though they are low, because the
equilibrium shifts from PL to R. Revelation of high costs thus creates
a credibility problem and does not work either. For example, if North
Korea says that it does not have nuclear weapons, and if it not
verifiable under our assumption, then South Korea will have
difficulty to trust it.
Thus, whether the case concerns strategic substitutes or
complements, there are incentives to pretend to having high costs
-- and not revealing the full truth. Pretending to be a high cost
country helps free riding (the case of substitutes), or inducing the
13

rival country to relax its guard (the case of complements).
An
incentive compatible system is not constructed in this particular
model.
All the discussions will be different if we change the
assumption that on;J..y a low cost structure is verifiable. The presence
of any surveillance or inspection method that can verify the absence
of certain types of weapons would help towards achieving relative
arms reductions in the world.
Finally, a highly relevant factor for defense analysis is the
"game of brinkmanship." Brinkmanship is also called the game of
chicken, which is a challenge to see which player will give in first.
For example, two opponents drive cars towards each other at a high
speed from opposite ends of a road to see who will turn away first
to avoid a crash. If neither driver concedes, then a catastrophe
results. If one party "chickens out," then the other driver will
win.
In international politics, the best cited example of
brinkmanship is the Cuban missile crisis staged by John F. Kennedy
and Nikita Khrushchev. Another example is the Mayaguez Incident
which occurred during the U.S. war with Vietnam (Nalebuff, 1991).
After many frustrating incidents in Vietnam, a U.S. ship, the
Mayaguez, was captured by Cambodia, but a U.S. military force
immediately intervened and rescued it.
Even an often believed
liberal newspaper like the New York Times wrote that the confidence
in the U.S. military authority that had been lost in Vietnam was
recovered. A non-military example was the recent Japan-u.s. trade
conflict concerning the import of American automobiles to Japan.
In a brinkmanship game, it is always safe for each player to adopt
a compromising attitude to avoid a crisis. However, sometimes a
nation has to signal its commitment to its principles or to a hard
line strategy. If one player concedes, then the other will continue
to take advantage. In the trade conflict game, for example, Japan
--- in spite of reportedly having their conversation bugged --- tried
to keep a strong attitude for a possible appeal to the WTO. This
is a continuing game, and reputation is important. If you sometimes
act with a firm commitment, your opponent might become conciliatory.
Of course, if the other party also takes an uncompromising attitude,
both parties will end up with the worst situation, for example, the
breakdown of relationships if it is a trade negotiation game, and
possible nuclear destruction if it is a strategic game.
When one player takes an uncompromising attitude, there is a
dynamic trade-off between the long-term benefits of reputation
building and the short run opportunity cost probability of
14

catastrophe. Nalebuff (1986) shows through a dynamic benefit cost
analysis that the tactics of playing gently at first, and then playing
tough later does not pay. Where there is uncertainty, showing a
strong attitude may help build the credibility of commitment towards
the opposite party.

S.

Conclusions

We would like to conclude this short paper by emphasizing the fact
that the strategic structure of world military interdependence has
changed from the alliance structure to the competitive arms building
since the fall of the Berlin wall. The strategic structure changed
from one of strategic substitutes to strategic complements.
Of
course, in those areas, where neighboring disputes or actual warfare
are going on, such as Iraq, Iran, Israel, North Korea and Bosnia,
the above theory would be too abstract. In those areas there would
only be limited applications of the pure theory we have just
developed.
However, the tendency for small countries to spend more in a
"keeping up with the Joneses" game is worth noting.
This is in
contrast to the tendency that a large country in an alliance spends
more because others are tempted to enjoy free-rides positions in a
military alliance. The corresponding theoretical difference between
strategic substitutes and the strategic complements is also
important because the incentive to disclose military strength is
affected by the distinction of substitutes and complements.
Finally, the crucially important problem for peace research is
to design a system that gives fewer incentives to spend on military
arms and accordingly to reduce the risk of war. One way would be
to improve the pay-off structure. Another would be to change the
rules of the game itself in such a way that the equilibrium from the
game will be more peaceful. In addition, nations could be persuaded
to play under new rules of the game. 5 In the theory of public goods
and collective action, this problem of how to design a proper game
to avoid the tragedy of commons or the prisoners' dilemma is

5

If you play a game of poker you have to determine under what conditions you play,
say a five card draw or seven card stud. However, for some people a certain way of playing
a game is intrinsically more advantageous than another way.
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relatively less developed (c.f. Sandler 1992). In game theory the
theory of mechanism design has been developed, but most of its refined
applications are directed to the optimal auction design and similar
problems. There exists a considerable distance before it can be
applied to institution building and to the problem of arms reduction.
We need a theory that indicates not only what rules and regimes
are desirable but how actual rules and regimes emerge. If we can
succeed in designing an incentive-compatible system that would
reduce the calamity of wars and, at the same time, help to find an
incentive compatible way to induce each nation to participate in the
arms-reduction schemes, it would mean substantial improvement in
human conditions on the globe.
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TABLE 1
Before the Berlin Wall
Risk from the Evil Empire
Responsibili ty

Free Ride

Responsibili ty

(2,

2)

( 1, 3)

Free Ride

(3,

1)

( 1, 1)

TABLE 2
After the Berlin Wall
Armament

Reduction

Armament

(1, 1)

(3,

O)

Reduction

(0, 3)

(2

2)
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